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In 1989, the mining giant Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) announced its intention to establish a coal mine and a privately owned power station near Mt Lesueur in Western Australia (WA). Local farmers initiated a campaign against the proposal, with other residents, unions, environmental movement organisations, artists and scientists being crucial to strategy formation and implementation. Campaigners faced the reality that although the Mt Lesueur area had enormous conservation signifi cance, it was not a pristine wilderness and was not well known, so its importance needed to be communicated to broader publics. Campaigners exploited chinks in the political opportunity structure by means of a collaborative campaign that relied on a carefully developed and well-coordinated campaigning network, with participants respecting others' very disparate identities, contributions and strengths. Unusual features of the campaign included the involvement of the union movement in the form of Perth-based artworker activists, rather than construction workers or coal miners. Conzinc Riotinto of Australia withdrew its plans in 1990, and the WA government subsequently gazetted the Lesueur National Park in 1992. The campaign illustrates the point that in order to understand alliances against the owners of big capital we must stretch the defi nition of 'worker' and, crucially, pay careful attention to socio-spatial issues if we are to understand how cross-class, rural-urban alliances develop in working landscapes.
In 1989-90, local residents and others waged a campaign against a proposal by the mining giant Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Limited (CRA) 1 to establish a coal mine and a privately owned power station in the Mt Lesueur area in Western Australia (WA). During the campaign a complex network developed amongst very different kinds of organisations, all with somewhat disparate aims. Farmers immediately affected by the proposal initiated the campaign, but other local residents, unions, environmental movement organisations, artists and scientists also participated, with very different but complementary local and Perth-based campaigning activities. In the face of strong opposition, CRA withdrew its plans in 1990, and in 1992 the WA government gazetted the Lesueur National Park. The campaigners were far-sighted: a paper in the journal Nature in 2000 declared WA's south-west, in which the Mt Lesueur area is one of the 'jewels', one of 25 global environmental 'hot spots' on account of threats to species extinction and to biodiversity. This article analyses the development of the campaign architecture and the strategies campaigners used. The research uses a multiple methods approach, drawing on interviews, media reports, and records and documents held by the participants. 3 The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it gives a short account of the signifi cance of the Mt Lesueur area and contextualises the company's proposal within the context of the political economy of power and the environment in WA. Secondly, it describes and analyses major elements of the campaigners' strategies and tactics. Thirdly, it draws on concepts from the sociology of protest and labour geography to analyse the creation of 'spaces of engagement', a concept
The Area, the Company Proposal and the Opportunity Structure
Mount Lesueur is a low, fl at-topped mesa surrounded by native bushland and cleared farmland, 200 kilometres north of Perth and 20 kilometres from the closest town, Jurien Bay, a small seaside regional centre and holiday destination. 5 In the late 1980s, the area was sparsely populated by farmers, retirees, tourist operators and fi shing families (including crayfi shers). Mount Lesueur, comprising 30 million hectares, is part of the 'WA Wheatbelt'. The fi rst white settlers around Mt Lesueur arrived in the 1950s. These were sheep and wheat farmers, with other crops, and cattle and pigs, introduced later. These settlers, many of whom were youthful fi rst-time farmers, had bought land cheaply under what was known as the Conditional Purchase scheme, a process of active government intervention underpinned by the state's ideology of developmentalism, 6 which led to clearing and thus to a rising water table and severe salinity problems. 7 By the 1980s, some farms were quite marginal, due to small size and/or productivity issues, and many families earned additional income, such as running a local fuel depot, doing earthmoving contracting or shearing or, for the women, doing paid work 'off farm'. 8 Through the 1980s, however, some farmers became increasingly aware of the extent of the environmental problems. 9 To the casual observer, the Mt Lesueur area, with its low landforms and mix of low vegetation and woodland punctuated by some higher areas of land, is much less spectacular than the nearby Pinnacles, 10 and the jarrah and karri forests in the south-west of the state. When these events began, the land around and including Mt Lesueur was simply a collection of unvested reserves, vacant Crown land and privately owned property. From the 1950s, several government reports recommended upgrading its status from 'C class reserve' to national park, 11 but the presence of coal reserves in the area was a signifi cant stumbling block. It was very much a working landscape for agricultural workers and a recreational space for both country and city people, rather than a distant pristine wilderness. However, it was (and is) 'one of the scenic and biological jewels of the South-West', equal to the better known Stirling Range and Fitzgerald River National Parks in the state's south. Lesueur's 'kwongan' shrubland is one of the richest sites for plant species in the world, many of them endangered. From the mid-nineteenth century, scientists and conservationists had documented the area's value, early botanist James Drummond dubbing it 'an El Dorado'.
In 1981, Canning Resources Pty Ltd, a subsidiary company of CRA Exploration Pty Ltd, had established mining tenements in the Mt Lesueur area under the Mining Act 1978 (WA). In November 1988, CRA and Barrack House Resources, jointly as the Hill River Power Development Company Pty Ltd, announced that they would develop a very large open-cut coal mine and a power station on the land.
12 About one-half of the area proposed to be mined, and the power station itself, fell within the boundaries of the putative reserve/national park (although Mt Lesueur itself would not be mined). Conzinc Riotinto of Australia's interest in the area was consistent with its corporate strategy at the time, which included similar power generation ventures in other states and New Zealand, where the aim was to supply cheap power for downstream processing in CRA-owned operations such as aluminium smelters. 13 Large mining and industrial sites are water hungry, and create air-and water-borne emissions; in the view of the locals, therefore, CRA's proposals would add to the environmental challenges they already faced.
The political economy of the times had two analytically distinct but intertwined aspects: the political economy of power generation, and the political economy of the environment. The political economy of WA at the time has been labelled with the shorthand term 'WA Inc.'. 14 Commentators have argued that the Labor-governed state had a radical developmentalist ethic 15 and a reliance on overseas capital, 16 a continuation of earlier, Liberal ideology and practice 17 in a state that has always been highly dependent on resource exports. Within this broader context, the political economy of power in WA was particularly volatile, with 'an interventionist state instituting new forms of governance and working aggressively to secure freedoms for capital', 18 arguing that cheaper power was needed to foster downstream industrial development.
19 Late in 1989, the government created a Power Options Review Committee, to evaluate the various power generation options. 20 Many in the state bureaucracy strongly supported the Hill River project. 21 The local political context was mixed as the two relevant local authorities held very divergent positions. Dandaragan Shire supported the development, since it fell wholly within the shire and it would reap the benefi ts in rates, whilst the neighbouring Coorow Shire, perceiving a possible loss of tourism revenue, was ambivalent. 22 The union movement was wary: CRA's subsidiary, Hamersley Iron Pty Limited, had from the early 1980s taken a unitarist, cost-cutting, legalistic approach to its WA workforce, 23 so a mine and private power station run by CRA rang warning bells for the union movement.
The political economy of the environment also infl uenced the nature of the campaign. In Australia, as in other western countries, environmentalism was incorporated into political agendas in response to public pressures, and state conservation bureaucracies developed signifi cantly in the late 1970s and 1980s. 24 Correspondingly, conservation groups grew in number and sophistication. 25 They also shifted their strategies from an adversarial culture involving dissent and mass mobilisation to a more 'insider' role. 26 By the 1980s, therefore, environmental movement organisations had acquired conventional organisational structures, employed paid staff and began directly infl uencing government policy, continuing, however, to display liberatory as well as corporatist tendencies. 27 The conservation movement also developed ways of networking with and working alongside local, community-based groups. They learnt, too, how to cooperate with each other as a result of some of the large-scale, high profi le 'wilderness' campaigns of the 1980s.
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In 1988-89, the political economy appeared to be favourable to CRA's plans. The political economy of conservation provided some opportunities, with the environmental movement developing a repertoire of campaigning techniques and environment law mandating a public review process. However, WA's strong legacy of developmentalism would be hard to challenge. The political economy of power seemed favourable to proponents of the power station and mine.
A Local Campaign: Group Formation and Campaigning Strategy
The focus for the campaign was the need for the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) of Western Australia to evaluate the CRA proposal. 29 In May 1990, CRA released an extensive submission 30 to initiate this process, with a 10-week public consultation period before Cabinet considered the proposal. The campaign to block CRA was thus quite short, with 1989 a 'warm up' period for the main campaign, and mid-1990 its climax (although it took another two years for gazettal of the national park).
The campaign started on a small scale. Five Lesueur farming families whose land CRA wished to purchase formed the Lesueur Landholders Powerhouse Action Group ('the Landholders Group') 31 in January 1989, immediately adopting a campaign footing by writing to the government and appointing a solicitor to provide advice. As one participant said:
[W]e had the bright idea that we would get hold of the most expensive and well thought of law fi rm in Perth … and get them to write to the SEC and get the details out of them … so we all dobbed in a hundred bucks … we had to go to that extreme to get [ 34 The Challenge Group's main aims were to publicise the impact of the power station on farming and fi shing industries, with a subsidiary concern about environmental impacts. By mid-year, the Challenge Group had 144 individual members, plus the state Wildfl ower Society and affi liated local wildfl ower groups. Locals in the Challenge Group had 'portfolios', researching their issues and then going to meetings to talk about them. They gathered a great range of research material from Australian and overseas sources on topics as diverse as hydrology and groundwater depletion, power station emissions, effects of industrial pollutants on marine life, the spread of dieback (a fungal disease of jarrah trees) and the social impact of mines. Challenge Group President Jim King says allocating portfolios ensured 'some order, instead of having everybody running around like headless chooks'. 35 Also in June 1989, campaigners formed an 'umbrella' group, the Friends of Lesueur Association ('the Friends of Lesueur'), 36 to coordinate all the groups working on the campaign. Some saw it as basically a 'Perth group', and certainly staff and activists from the Australian Conservation Foundation and the WA Conservation Council joined, but the majority of members were locals. 37 Membership overlapped signifi cantly between the groups. Most members of Challenge Group were also members of Friends of Lesueur; indeed, both organisations had the same president, Jim King. 38 Friends of Lesueur thus widened the campaign geographically but maintained the diverse base of involvement of people from all walks of life, many of whom had no previous involvement in conservation issues.
In January 1990, the Trades and Labor Council's Assistant Secretary, Rob Meecham, encouraged a friend, John Baas, a public sector human resources offi cer, to create an overarching organisation that would later become known as the Lesueur Forum. Baas's role was simply to convene; he was an 'honest broker', clarifying goals, ensuring agreed actions occurred, and generally coordinating relationships. The Forum (and, indeed, other groups created during the campaign) was never incorporated, which allowed fl exibility of operation. As was the pattern in this campaign, this group deliberately encompassed membership from previous groups, as well as representation from the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Workers Union, the Metal Trades Federation of Unions, and the Federated Miscellaneous Workers' Union (FMWU). The fi rst three unions had strong vested industrial interests in the expansion of coal mining and energy generation, and particularly in the privatisation of power. 39 The FMWU had coverage of national park rangers, and had earlier put submissions to government to create a national park in the Mt Lesueur area. But Baas cast a wide net: attending the fi rst meeting were three Australian Conservation Foundation personnel, a representative from Friends of Lesueur and the Challenge Group, botanist Ted Griffi n, and a member each from the Royal Australasian Ornithologists' Union and from the WA Wildfl ower Society (Inc.). 40 Also present was Labor MLA Ian Alexander, who described himself as 'a member of the public', not representing government, although he offered to be a link with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) caucus.
The Lesueur Forum engaged in a wide variety of activities. Some of these involved a very newly unionised group, artworker members of the Operative Painters and Decorators Union (OPDU). 41 Trades and Labor Council arts offi cer Ric McCracken reports that, in contrast to his usual role in initiating union arts projects himself, the Lesueur Forum came to him and said 'artists have to be involved, can you help?' It was in the unions' interests to frame a campaign that was about 'the public interest', that is, environmental protection, and not simply anti-private power station, hence the somewhat unusual approach. As arts offi cer, McCracken was used to being seen by an older guard of unionists as an 'interfering political lightweight' and welcomed the approach from the Forum and the meaty opportunities presented by the campaign for developing cultural strategies that came out of his experience in the art and working life movement. 42 Mostly emerging young artists, many OPDU artworker members had had experience on community arts projects and were quite politicised, albeit not industrially. McCracken and Di McAtee, artworker organiser for the OPDU (themselves visual artists) coordinated the artworkers' involvement and helped initiate a range of visual campaigning strategies including the production of a postcard 43 distributed as petitions by the WA Conservation Council; screen printed T-shirts; 44 and 30,000 copies of a professional, heavy-weight, glossy, fourpage colour brochure, which was sent to politicians as well as being distributed to the public. 45 Some participants describe the colour brochure as the single most important strategy used in the campaign. 46 Louise Lodge, an artist with a passion for environmental issues, curated an art exhibition at a Fremantle gallery to support the campaign, with 43 artists donating to the campaign part or all of the proceeds of the sale of 104 works. 47 Artists were actively involved in the development of cultural campaigning strategies, and many of the images were created during or immediately after their visits to the site. They had the dual roles of workers and unionists, with their occupational skills being directly deployed in campaigning. The unions' interest waned once CRA withdrew its proposals, although some individual unionists remained involved in the two-year process of (fi nally) having the national park gazetted.
The campaigners, and extra-locals, responded actively to CRA's extensive consultation process, which was coordinated by their public relations consultant.
Conzinc Riotinto of Australia conducted surveys of landholders, residents and recreational users, and local campaigners did likewise. There were also numerous public and semi-public meetings between the company and other interested parties. 48 Although campaigners engaged with the formal EPA process by making formal written submissions, those activities were subordinated to a broader strategy; arguments that would be read only by a few bureaucrats and politicians were not going to win the day. So media-friendly site visits were organised for anyone who wanted to come, and a key feature of the campaign was the extensive coverage in The West Australian, The Sunday Times and The Daily News fuelled by these site visits. Although a business journalist for The West Australian wrote a few op-ed pieces unsympathetic to the campaigning in mid-1989, citing 'loony environmentalists', 'luddite unions' and 'basket weavers and fl ower farmers', 49 most journalists 50 saw Mt Lesueur as a good story in which the campaigners gave them much more colourful material and quotes, illustrated with pictures of convoys of touring vehicles, and local people standing by signs saying 'rare plants', 51 than did CRA. Articles about the area, many of them large feature articles with photographs, appeared at least fortnightly in one or other of those three main Perth newspapers from mid-1989 to mid-1990.
Creating such impact in the media, and all the other aspects of the campaign, was time consuming. Every participant interviewed recalled the relentless pressure of campaigning. Timing and luck played a part in the campaign's success, according to Jim King:
It cost us individually thousands and thousands of dollars with time off the farm and the money we were putting into [the campaign] … but farming wasn't too bad at that time. Had the campaign been earlier, we would have been so snowed under with trying to develop our farms that we just wouldn't have had time. Had it come later when there'd been a collapse in the wool prices, stock prices, again we would have been fl at out, but we were lucky that at that time things weren't too bad. 52 Environmental groups became active in the campaign at an early stage. Bringing experience from eastern states campaigns, Neil Blake had started work at the end of 1988 as WA coordinator for the Australian Conservation Foundation, headed in WA by President Phil Jennings. The Mt Lesueur campaign fi tted very neatly as a 'local' issue into national campaigns on energy effi ciency and greenhouse gases. Blake, Jennings and other Foundation personnel worked in tandem with Rachel Siewert, coordinator of the WA Conservation Council. Both organisations kept in touch with local developments, with someone visiting the Mt Lesueur area at least once a month, usually attending a Challenge Group or Friends of Lesueur meeting. Foundation and Council strategies included an indefatigable stream of press releases on all kinds of issues, some mobilising support from 'name' environmentalists to attract media attention and others promoting the tours that landholders organised for all and sundry. For instance, the environmental organisations arranged for activist Vince Serventy to visit the region in 1989, accompanied by a Sunday Times reporter, 53 and in April 1990, as the campaign heated up, they contacted Canadian environmentalist David Suzuki with information, leading to public statements by Suzuki criticising the plans. 54 Blake says: 'I don't recall there ever being anybody who thought they were in charge or anything like that. It was a truly cooperative exercise'. 55 Some direct action took place: WA Wilderness Society members marched on Parliament House in November 1989 and presented a request for the area to be protected, with Active Community Environmentalists members in Geraldton doing the same at the offi ce of the Minister for Mines, Fuel and Energy, MLA Jeff Carr (whose electorate was based in Geraldton, the closest large town to Mt Lesueur).
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Campaigners
57 However, 'demonstrating' by street marches was very limited, in keeping with the overall ethos of the central local campaigners who, it will be seen below, developed a particular style for the campaign.
Individual scientists also played vital roles in the campaign, not only because of their contribution to scientifi c knowledge (important as that was), but by infl uencing policy from the inside, and public opinion. Conservation biology developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a 'science of engagement', focused on environmental problems such as species and habitat loss and overexploitation of resources, as well as a 'science of discovery'. 58 It has a normative role 59 that informs and infl uences public policy 60 on issues that are often 'intractable, "wicked problems" that have no defi nitive formulation … and no test for solution'. 61 No one could gainsay the biological and geological signifi cance of the Mt Lesueur area, with over a century of research underscoring its uniqueness. 62 However, good science and articulate public communication is not always a match for rampant developmentalism and a lack of political will. The campaign exemplifi es the varied ways in which scientists can engage with decision-making and policy processes.
Botanist Angas Hopkins played a role in both research and policy. He had researched the Lesueur fl ora and, in 1984, while working for the then Environment Minister, encouraged a proposal to set aside the area as an A-class reserve. During the Mt Lesueur campaign, Hopkins was working for Environment Minister Bob Pearce as a policy offi cer, and so although unable to publicly campaign because of his role, was in a key position to infl uence government. 63 Andrew Burbidge, a conservation zoologist with a focus on the ecology of threatened species, was director of research in the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) and a member of its corporate executive at the time of the campaign. Steve Hopper was CALM's most senior fl ora conservation biologist at the time. Their roles likewise precluded any involvement in the campaign. Nevertheless, their engagement as scientists and their contributions to scientifi c reports were important. Ted Griffi n was a consultant botanist who did contract work for CALM and the private sector, including preparing scientifi c reports for CRA in the early to mid-1980s. He negotiated with CRA that he and others could share that knowledge with the broader community. (Hopkins had originally collected some of the information in the CALM report, referred to above, for CRA.) Despite possible threats to his livelihood, given that his income came from consulting, Griffi n became very actively involved in the 1980s as an advocate for the area. 64 His deeply engaged scientifi c work over a long period, and its public nature, were crucial to the campaign's success. Hopper and Burbidge coordinated the production of a CALM report, presented to the EPA, on the conservation values of the Lesueur region. The then Minister of the Environment, Ian Taylor, demanded revisions, including deleting references to the region as a 'proposed national park'. The West Australian published extracts from both versions, which helped to sway public opinion against any mining. 65 Scientists thus played both 'hands off' and 'engaged' roles in the campaign, depending on their particular locations, each contributing what they were able to.
The Mt Lesueur campaign bore fruit. In July 1990, the State Energy Commission of WA announced that it had dropped the CRA proposal as a viable power generation option and the EPA recommended against the mine. Conzinc Riotinto of Australia then withdrew its proposal from consideration in the face of the public campaign and to avoid Ministerial rejection which by then was inevitable. In December 1990, the Environmental Protection Authority upheld an earlier recommendation that the Lesueur area be classed as a Class A national park. The government fi nally gazetted the park, with only an existing gravel pit as an excision, in February 1992. 66 Conzinc Riotinto of Australia had reputedly spent $20 million on proving the coal reserves and attempting to develop them, while the Lesueur Forum collected less than $20,000 in donations, much of it from the labour movement, illustrating the effectiveness of resource mobilisation. Campaigners jubilantly celebrated the decision. Iain Wilson, one of the local farmers and a key campaigner, accompanied by Andrew Burbidge and Steve Hopper, 'walked through the bush and up to the top of Mt Lesueur and had a quiet celebratory cup of tea'.
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'Spaces of Engagement'
One of the key features of the campaign was the way in which successful alliances were created between groups and across space. The campaign's political and media strategies were necessarily centered in Perth, but the area to be 'saved' was 200km away and was not well known prior to the campaign. Local landholders created relationships across space by tirelessly conducting guided tours of Mt Lesueur and its environs from Perth; by July 1990, 1,200 people had been taken on 'offi cial' tours by local people 68 in addition to the many people who drove up and followed the quirky, hand-drawn illustrated maps produced by Wildfl ower Society members and painstakingly roneoed by campaigners. Weekend after weekend, convoys of politicians, unionists, conservationists, artists and others travelled the dusty tracks of Lesueur, led by local landholders such as Jim King, Iain Wilson and Don Williams. Artworker organiser Di McAtee recalls bouncing along the tracks in her battered Range Rover with its union and ALP stickers, behind the farmers' four wheel drive vehicles with their NFF (National Farmers' Federation) bumper stickers. 69 Short and longer visits, often with barbecues and weekend stays on local properties, created social networks across space that led to increased knowledge of the cause and commitment to it. These events also brought the local farmers and Jurien locals, town residents, crayfi shing families and the like, together. As botanist Ted Griffi n put it later:
You couldn't speak about the size and importance of the area; you really had to get them out in the bush. The impact on [visitors] was dramatic. Because they'd come over the brow of the hill and then suddenly there was this opening up of the landscape in front of them and some of them said it was a seminal moment for them. But you couldn't have that in a virtual sense; you have to actually have them experience it. 70 Local campaign participant Lesley Boshammer recalled: '[Iain Wilson] would get out his little [magnifying glass] and show them the edge of a smoke bush or something, because on the inside you could see the tiny little red bits on the fl ower'. 71 Creating such a community across space meant developing 'spaces of engagement' where more 'local' interests could interact with various tiers of government, and with the media and civil society organisations, in order to enhance the campaigners' power resources. Spaces of engagement are broader political spaces, in contrast to the spaces of dependence in which everyday lives are lived. 72 A network of associations is an effective way of 'creating spaces of engagement' 73 that further campaign goals. In this campaign, the 'ripple' of overlapping, interlinked organisations on the one hand, complemented by landholders' guided tours on the other, created such spaces of engagement.
The campaigning structure thus deployed to good effect 'networks of spatial connectivity', rather than privileging a single spatiality as spatialities 'are coimplicated in complex ways'. 74 Put somewhat differently, the campaigners' strategies were consistent with a 'joined up' view of the nature of socio-spatial relations, 75 using both 'the power of place', in this case a stunning landscape of great biodiversity, and the power generated by a wider network of very varied actors all with considerable political savvy. The campaign did not exhibit a simplistic duality of scale (that is, weaving together 'the local' and 'the state'). 76 Rather, campaigners literally worked at creating scale. They privileged the local but at the same time refused to be duped by arguments that the internal logics of capital, that is, CRA, or the interests of the state as defi ned by a few should 'trump' local concerns. Campaigners ensured that local concerns became extra local by involvement of environmental groups and unions, defl ecting the charge of 'NIMBY-ism'. 77 It was the interrelationships of the strategies of groups working at different scales that made it a successful campaign.
Place Attachment
Through this network of socio-spatial associations, an 'imagined' Mt Lesueur community came into being, drawing on the strong visceral attachments of locals and non-locals to the physical place of 'Mt Lesueur'. This imagined community was small, perhaps 50 at the local level and a few hundred elsewhere, as is common in any campaign. However, they made their voices count not only by creating new organisations but by spreading the word via existing local organisations such as residents' groups, school parents' and citizens' associations and small local newspapers produced on roneo machines and photocopiers. Thus campaigning strategies used existing networks and shaped their strategies to them, drawing on both 'territorial' and 'imagined' notions of community and actively creating an imagined community by bringing extra-local actors 'into' the local community. The created community was, in Liepins's terms, simultaneously a material/geographic and an immaterial/social phenomenon used as a resource by the campaigners. 78 Participants had visceral, tangible attachments to the physical landscape. All participants interviewed, whether local or extra-local, remember the physical experiences of the campaign nearly 20 years after the events, and were able to describe the landscape's effects on them in great detail and often with strong displays of emotion. 79 No one experience was like anyone else's; as others have noted, such attachments can vary in intensity and kind, with the same place meaning different things to different people, 80 since places are culturally constructed rather than 'given'. Clearly the farmers and other locals had a particularly strong attachment, as it was where they lived and where their livelihood was. Non-locals developed their own 'sense of place' through their visits and their interaction with locals with deep fi rsthand knowledge of the land and a willingness to acquaint others with it. Perth-based campaigners thus invested a series of meanings and values in Lesueur that were shared via Lesueur Forum meetings and campaigning activities. However, local participants report deliberately keeping a cap on their emotions publicly: 'We never stood up and talked emotionally about things', sublimating their purely personal feelings for the place when on public view, and framing their spoken views in terms of scientifi c discourse, 'silenc[ing] the personal to speak to the public'. 81 The strategies developed by OPDU artworker members and other artists, such as local farmers Margaret King and Sara Kenny and Perth-based campaigner Cathy Taylor (who was Ted Griffi n's partner), were crucial in creating this 'imagined community'. The hospitality of local landowners in hosting site visits enabled artists to engage directly with the place: to see, to photograph, to sketch and paint. Many of those interviewed mentioned the song, 'Have we watched the fi nal wedgetail fl y the slopes of Mt Lesueur?', written by Johnnie Miller, as encapsulating the values of the campaign. They also highlighted the importance of the Mt Lesueur Art Award in cementing relationships between groups and individuals as well as conveying campaign imagery. This aspect of the campaign deserves a more detailed examination than is possible here; it is a vibrant example of an organic art and working life project and was part of the fl owering of that movement in the 1970s and 1980s. 82 
Legitimacy and Identity
Local campaigners maintained a coherent identity focused on respectable rurality and use of credible scientifi c evidence. They were quick to distance themselves from protestors in other campaigns which 'often involved hairy people singing protest songs' and to stress that the Lesueur campaigners were not 'militant' and, by agreement, local participants had a 'dress code': 'we dressed as if we were going to the bank, you didn't go in in your stubbies and your thongs'. 83 The campaign attracted no negative media attention, 84 perhaps as there were no non-local protestors such as have been noted in 'direct action' protests in the UK 85 and in Australia. This was partly in response to condescension some perceived from CRA representatives: 'they tended to [imply] we were fairly uneducated'. 86 Spokespeople were chosen according to the audience, again to underline legitimacy; members of some of the campaigning groups asked Iain Wilson to speak to 'anyone intellectual as he was well educated and had been a conservator of forests'. 87 Consistent with this, others reported him as 'very persuasive … a total optimist … everything was going to happen just the way he wanted it'. 88 Some participants described themselves as 'more low-key', not involved in formal groups but contributing in other ways. Sara Kenny was very active; her husband Mike exerted infl uence via his role as a Dandaragan councillor. 89 It is important to emphasise that campaigners' identities were, in many cases, fl uid and multifarious. This added to their legitimacy in 'speaking for the land'. Don and Joy Williams, original conditional purchase settlers from the mid-1960s, were dedicated environmentalists who deliberately left portions of their land uncleared. Judy and John Browne fenced off their creek to prevent grazing in the early 1980s, leading to locals dubbing the area 'Brownie's Loony Park', and Margaret and Jim King did likewise. Iain Wilson had worked in Scotland and South Africa before coming to Australia to create a farm at Badgingarra that was to become 'a model of conservation planning'. 90 In short, there was the beginning of 'multifunctional' agriculture in the region; that is, exploration of more sustainable pathways to agricultural development that embrace environmental amenity, landscape management and the preservation of biodiversity, 91 and this led to increasingly complex identities for local farmers. Issues of identity and personal history were central to other aspects of the campaign. Baas was not familiar with the Mt Lesueur area itself prior to the campaign, but was a keen recreational fi sherman who shared a beachside fi shing shack in the area with friends. A self-described 'khaki greenie' (not quite 'pea green'), and 'a born administrator', Baas brokered alliances between conservationists, unionists and locals, playing a boundary-spanning role that was effective because he had no strong personal allegiances in any camp and, in particular, had no 'union identity'. Thus the campaigners were able to make use of multiple identities and dense networks of ties.
The land itself, given a 'voice' by the scientists who studied it, was perhaps the greatest 'legitimating' force in the campaign. The scientifi c value of the area had been thoroughly documented in such diverse arenas as The Journal of Applied Ecology and CALM's popular Landscope magazine.
92 Scientifi c fi ndings were disseminated in an accessible way by sympathetic journalists in a great many newspaper articles. At the same time, scientists who had studied the area were highly sensitive to the wider cultural and social values of the landscape, and that it had a human history as well as a biological one. In accordance with conservation biology's vital role at the conjuncture of 'fundamental sciences with broader political and community processes', 93 they had been listening to and learning from local voices, as well as sharing their knowledge in active, participatory ways. The scientists recognised that environments do not have to be pristine or untouched; 'working landscapes' are worthy of conservation.
A crucial lens for analysing the campaign is to explore the complex identity of 'the worker' in relation to the working landscape. Scientists were 'workers too'. Their job was to fi nd and disseminate scientifi c knowledge, a job with ethical and moral dimensions. Farmers, as well as the crayfi shers and others, were 'workers too'. Also embedded in the landscape, albeit temporarily, were the most active group of unionists, the artworkers. There were no gesticulating coal-mining or power-station workers to be seen during the campaign, although a small handful of senior union offi cials were contributing members of the Lesueur Forum. There was nothing tangible happening in 1989-90 that could be opposed with traditional forms of industrial action. The campaign was a media and public relations battleground, in which local interests and identities and values, bolstered by an 'art and working life' approach, were the potent weapons of choice. At the same time, the interests of the conservation movement were served by unions' political connections to the ALP, the party in power. Unions, '[w]ith a social base and very often privileged channels of access to institutional decision-makers (both directly through the public administration and indirectly through the political parties) … can increase the mobilisation capacities and chances of success for social movements'. 94 The Trades and Labor Council was therefore able to infl uence key decision-makers indirectly through its links with Labor politicians. If the Lesueur campaign had been unsuccessful and CRA not withdrawn its bid, the unions would, without question, have begun a more traditional industrial campaign consisting of rank and fi le mobilisation around work bans on mine and power station construction.
Legitimacy was created by the breadth of supporting organisations with a variety of perspectives, local and non-local. Legitimacy was underscored by the mutually respectful relations of campaigning groups. For instance, John Baas was respected as an 'honest broker' facilitating the effective operation of the Lesueur Forum; he reports having to 'gee up' Perth-based participants at times but this did not appear to result in any alienation. Local campaigners were also very positive about the role of the Australian Conservation Foundation and the WA Conservation Council: '[T]hey were wonderful … the conservation [council] and anybody else who wanted information [was sent it]. We found that if we gave them information, we got, very often, better stuff back from them'. 95 Reciprocally, Neil Blake recalls that:
[T]he passion of those people [the Lesueur locals] was quite extraordinary, and their sheer doggedness. They just wouldn't take 'no' for an answer. That was incredibly cheering to the conservation groups, who were used to bashing their heads against brick walls on so many issues. 96 This mutual respect, and the structural linkages provided by the Lesueur Forum and other groups, helped form and maintain a cohesive collective identity for the campaign, something that has been a fraught issue in other community-based campaigns.
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An Absence: Indigenous Voices
The voices of Indigenous people were absent in the campaign. The Wheatbelt, like other areas of WA, is a place of Dreaming for Aboriginal people. However, there is no mention in the public record of the campaign, including newspaper reports, or in the interviews, of any consultation with Aboriginal people by the company, the government or the wider community. The explanation is not, however, hard to fi nd. As Anna Haebich has documented, 98 the Wheatbelt was, shockingly, 'cleared' in a human sense as well as in other senses, over a number of decades in the twentieth century. A CALM-organised tour of the Wheatbelt by Aboriginal elders in 1993, that is, several years after the campaign, was the fi rst time for over 40 years that elders had been to the area.
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Conclusions
Why did the campaign succeed? There are many answers to this question, but the focus on the article has been to elucidate campaigning structures and strategies rather than to formulate a defi nitive answer to this question. Participants gave very diverse interpretations of the 'success factors', with some discounting the impact
of the campaign and privileging political processes, and others highlighting the effectiveness of the strategies used by the campaigners.
The central role of rural landholders in this campaign is an illustration of 'land stewardship' in action, which involves farmers being alive to social, economic and environmental issues; issues that public policy is only just coming to grips with, slowly and with many false starts. 100 The campaign also illustrates the kinds of productive relationships that can develop between landholders and scientists in the pursuit of environmental protection. Farmers are at times perceived as very much part of the problem of environmental management, rather than part of the solution; 101 in the case of Mt Lesueur, there had been years of mutually respectful, educative dialogue between landholders and scientists which stood the campaign in good stead. Some scientists were able to exert infl uence from within government and the bureaucracy based on their expert knowledge and understandings of government policy.
The Mt Lesueur campaign disrupts the 'urban, middle-class' stereotype of the environmental protestor. Firstly, Lesueur landholders would challenge any attempt to defi ne their class position, as they identify fi rst and foremost as rural people. The campaign united the landholders with other primary industry workers, mostly small scale and self employed, and with working-and middle-class participants, and it involved artists who variously identifi ed as one or more of 'local' or 'unionist' or 'conservationist'. The campaign also shows how unions can become actively involved in environmental issues using strategies well outside their usual strategic repertoire. In short, the campaign illustrates the point that effective alliances against the owners of big capital are often cross-class, and that we must stretch the defi nition of 'worker' and, crucially, pay careful attention to identity issues if we are to understand how alliances develop in working landscapes such as the environs of Mt Lesueur.
Building on the principles that the Australian conservation movement had been developing around ecologically sustainable development and the importance of local community consultation, 102 the campaign, according to Neil Blake, 'felt like a new way of doing things' for the conservation movement, 103 and this is true for the union movement as well. More globally pressing issues such as climate change face both movements now. Whether past collaborative relationships such as this have sown the seed for future coalitions remains to be seen. 
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